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The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted economies and societies throughout the world since
early 2020. Education is especially affected, with schools and universities widely closed for
long periods. People under 25 years have the lowest risk of severe disease but their activ-
ities can be key to persistent ongoing community transmission. A challenge arose for how
to provide education, including university level, without the activities of students increasing
wider community SARS-CoV-2 infections. We used a Hazard Analysis of Critical Control
Points (HACCP) framework to assess the risks associated with university student activity and
recommend how to mitigate these risks. This tool appealed because it relies on multiagency
collaboration and interdisciplinary expertise and yet is low cost, allowing rapid generation
of evidence-based recommendations. We identified key critical control points associated with
university student’ activities, lifestyle, and interaction patterns both on-and-off campus. Un-
acceptable contact thresholds and the most up-to-date guidance were used to identify levels
of risk for potential SARS-CoV-2 transmission, as well as recommendations based on exist-
ing research and emerging evidence for strategies that can reduce the risks of transmission.
Employing the preventative measures we suggest can reduce the risks of SARS-CoV-2 trans-
mission among and from university students. Reduction of infectious disease transmission
in this demographic will reduce overall community transmission, lower demands on health
services and reduce risk of harm to clinically vulnerable individuals while allowing vital ed-
ucation activity to continue. HACCP assessment proved a flexible tool for risk analysis in a
specific setting in response to an emerging infectious disease threat. Systematic approaches
to assessing hazards and risk critical control points (#HACCP) enable robust strategies for
protecting students and staff in HE settings during #COVID19 pandemic.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Emerging infectious diseases present substan-
tial threats to global health (Jones et al., 2008).
The current outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 that causes
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COVID-19 disease caught countries unaware and
presented unprecedented challenges. As of April 6,
2021 the pandemic is linked to over 130 million con-
firmed cases and 2.84 million deaths (as at04/06/21;
WHO, 2020a). The long-term socioeconomic harms
of the pandemic are forecast with alarming num-
bers across multiple sectors including employment,
global GDP, national debt, and public service provi-
sion (World Bank, 2020). It is people under 25 years
that are least in danger from the virus clinically (Rus-
sell et al., 2020), but this group arguably will shoulder
the greatest long-term burden that result from for the
current efforts to control the virus in-order to reduce
societal harms. These dis-benefits/disadvantages in-
clude reduced education, reduced employment op-
portunities, and living longer with degraded quality
public services that in turn includes education that is
likely to be highly resource-restricted in the near fu-
ture (Maher, Hoang, & Hindery, 2020).
Early analyses suggests that closures of educa-
tional facilities had helped to reduce the outbreak
in individual countries (Davies, Kucharski, Eggo,
Gimma, & Edmunds, 2020; Hunter, Colon-Gonzalez,
Brainard, & Rushton, 2020; Li et al., 2020), through
a variety of mechanisms. Although it remains unclear
exactly how likely young children are to be infected
by or transmit SARS-CoV-2, educational establish-
ments contain adults that are interacting, collaborat-
ing, and mixing. Also, young children are typically
escorted to schools by adults who encounter other
adults en route. Secondary and tertiary students of-
ten travel to school using public transport interacting
highly with both each other and other adults en route
and on site.
The prospect of shutting down educational facil-
ities for long durations during the pandemic was not
viable because the resultant unacceptable harm to
both individuals and the wider economy was highly
likely. For the age range 18–24 there was an ad-
ditional consideration: a University College Lon-
don survey found that loneliness during early lock-
down was common in the age demographic (Leavey,
Eastaugh, & Kane, 2020), an age when counts of
social contacts normally peak rather than contract
(Mossong et al., 2008). Full time home-study could
increase loneliness and was often physically ham-
pered by practical problems: many young adults live
in rented accommodation without adequate quiet
and dedicated space at home to study effectively
(Leavey et al., 2020). Good internet access from
home, or access to a Personal Computer/laptop,
could also not be assured for all even in high income
countries (Auxier & Anderson, 2020; Wakefield,
2020). For individuals, a decision to suspend educa-
tion/training and enter the labor market temporar-
ily was not appealing as unemployment rates rose
sharply (CTV News, 2020; Ergocun, 2020; Heath,
2020). For those students starting the new academic
year in September 2020, approximately a third would
have been enrolling in their first year of univer-
sity study, which would bring with it additional un-
knowns.
A societal problem with the prospect of sus-
pending university education for an uncertain but
long duration was the medium-long term effects on
professional training. Most high-income countries
recruit each year large numbers of newly trained
graduates into a wide range of key worker profes-
sions, including nursing, medicine, allied health pro-
fessions, social care, engineering, science, and teach-
ing. Suspending university education would increase
existing shortages of essential degree-qualified work-
ers across multiple sectors (Garcia & Weiss, 2019;
Gilroy, 2019). Replacement recruitment of profes-
sionals from other parts of the world was unlikely
given long training times required and pandemic dis-
ruption of education everywhere. It was also appar-
ent that some universities faced severe financial cri-
sis if students did not return to conventional ter-
tiary education provision environment (Drayton &
Waltmann, 2020); contraction of the tertiary educa-
tion sector is not desirable as pandemic conditions
demonstrated the value of degree trained profession-
als for response and infectious disease control.
Ensuring the continuation of tertiary education
during the pandemic was imperative. Some degree
courses can be effectively delivered in a tele-learning
(online) format, but many courses still depend on
practical work in laboratories, using university equip-
ment as well as placement opportunities in external
facilities that deliver in-person training. This reliance
on specific facilities and types of training is especially
true for vocational courses such as medicine, nursing,
midwifery, and physiotherapy is a challenge faced by
our own institution which normally graduates hun-
dreds of qualified health professionals each year. We
were also aware that many nonhealth care students
in our community, studying entirely online univer-
sity degrees, lived on or near to campus and might
still rely on other types of community locations (field
work) or university facilities (such as the library or
laboratories).
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Therefore, the aim of this research was to iden-
tify the critical control points among the usual and
necessary activities of university students—points
where the risks of transmission were greatest but
could also be mitigated and reduced—to make rec-
ommendations for mitigating these risks. The ap-
proach for this research involved the use of the
Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (Ha)
framework; a low-cost tool for rapid assessment,
that is simple for stakeholders to engage in, encour-
ages multiagency collaboration and interdisciplinary
expertise whilst generating evidence-based recom-
mendations (Edmunds, Hunter, Few, & Bell, 2013).
HACCP assessments originated in risk management
of food production systems, but have been increas-
ingly used to assess risks related to an emerging
health threats and infectious diseases (see Edmunds
et al., 2013, 2016).
We applied the HACCP approach to the activi-
ties of university students and propose this method as
a potential tool to generate recommendations when
dealing with a rapidly evolving infectious disease out-
break. Here we provide a demonstration for how this
rapid assessment tool can be used as part of a re-
sponse toolkit for novel infectious disease outbreaks
and describe the application of the HACCP frame-
work to a Higher Education setting. We identify be-
haviors and practices linked to typical student activ-
ities, which are likely to present risks for the trans-
mission, both direct and indirect, of SARS-CoV-2.
HACCP assessments are potentially powerful meth-
ods that can be used as rapid response tools in spe-
cific settings during emerging infectious disease out-
breaks, as a precursor to more time-consuming and
costly quantitative data collection, biomedical test-
ing, and clinical studies in specific settings.
2. METHODS
To complete our assessment of the risks of
SARS-CoV-2 transmission during the return of stu-
dents to UK university settings during the COVID-19
pandemic, we followed the first three HACCP prin-
ciples as follows:
(1) To outline the key “risk” stages in the system
being investigated,
(2) To identify the critical control points (CCPs)
within the system being investigated and,
(3) To develop CCPs and recommendations to
control the identified hazards (as used in pre-
vious studies into EIDs; Edmunds et al., 2013,
2016).
The first stage of the process involved a se-
ries of virtual workshops and meetings amongst the
HACCP team; all of whom were based at the higher
education setting of the University of East Anglia
(UEA) in Norwich, UK; a campus-based university
with a student population of 17,429 in 2019/20 (of
which 8,067 [46.3%] were new starters) (UEA, 2020).
The HACCP team includes experts in the fields of mi-
crobiology, infectious diseases, EIDs, public health,
environmental health, science communication, stu-
dent safety, and student administrative services. The
first workshop and subsequent follow-up discussions
led to the creation of early versions of six flowcharts
which consider different scenarios for student inter-
actions on campus. These were (i) on-campus teach-
ing; (ii) off-campus teaching; (iii) living on campus;
(iv) living off-campus; (v) nonteaching on-campus ac-
tivities, and (vi) social activities. Following further
consultation, the flowcharts were then critically an-
alyzed by the team and finalized, simplified versions
produced. A hazard was considered to be a process
that could take place within a higher education uni-
versity setting that would provide the opportunity,
at an unacceptable level of risk, for the transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 to another person. Taking into ac-
count the likelihood of a situation occurring and the
likelihood of SARS-CoV-2 transmission being able
to occur within that situation, the hazards were then
grouped into high, medium, and low-risk categories.
We generated recommendations for high-risk critical
control points. The focus on high-risk CCPs is be-
cause our key objective was to make a set of recom-
mendations that would do most to reduce transmis-
sion of SARS CoV-2 without being too onerous and
likely to be followed. In concurrent circumstances
(late 2020), an eradication strategy was not feasible
in the UK. However, effective suppression of wide
transmission to strongly limit harms from COVID-
19 was stated in government policy and supported by
most institutions and public experts (BBC, 2020; UK
Government, 2020a). Therefore, in this HACCP ex-
ercise, we focused our recommendations on only sit-
uations which generate the majority of transmissions
(“high risk”), but this HACCP exercise did not ad-
dress situations where likelihood of transmission was
low or medium. Our intention was to seek recom-
mendations to keep the prevalence of infections at
low and manageable levels in both universities and
the wider communities they engage with. This would
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have maximum impact while risk of transmission is
high but a move to focus on lower risk transmission
activities could be part of further HACCP steps if a
near-elimination strategy for community COVID-19
control became viable.
Following validation of the flowchart, the same
team of experts focused on all of the high-risk
hazards and determined appropriate critical control
points (CCPs). A CCP is a point at which there is the
opportunity to control, prevent, or eliminate the risks
for pathogen transmission. Critical limits were then
set for each of the CCPs identified. These critical lim-
its are thresholds used as preventative measures to
control the hazards within the system. The outputs of
each of these three principles were cross-referenced
with the existing literature on SARS-CoV-2 epidemi-
ology, prevention, and control.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Hazard Analysis
Our HACCP assessment of the risks of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission for students in UK university
settings during the COVID-19 pandemic identified
high-risk potentially hazardous practices linked to
social interactions, teaching sessions, and day-to-day
on-campus activities (Supporting Information Table
I). Primary concerns were shared use of social spaces
such as sports changing rooms, prayer facilities, study
facilities including teaching rooms, and rooms for the
examination of patients for those students on medi-
cal and health science courses. When considering the
sharing of student residences (both on and off cam-
pus), all those ordinarily living within the student
residence were considered to come from the same
household. Thus, social distancing and other protec-
tive measures such as the use of face coverings dur-
ing interactions between them was not deemed nec-
essary, unless one or more members of the household
were presenting with symptoms of COVID-19 or had
received a positive test result in the previous 14 days.
All other activities and practices linked to students
at higher education establishments were deemed to
present a medium or low level of risk for the trans-
mission of SARS CoV-2.
3.2. Critical Control Points and Critical Limits
In total, 22 high-risk CCPs were identified by this
HACCP assessment. Each CCP is a point at which
there is an opportunity to adopt measures to reduce
the risks of transmission of SARS CoV-2 during the
return of students to UK university settings. Follow-
ing extensive consultation and cross-referencing with
the existing literature, critical limits were then pro-
posed for each high-risk CCP. In many cases, multi-
ple recommendations were made for each CCP (Sup-
porting Information Table I).
Several of the critical limits suggested include
fundamental infection control practices for coron-
aviruses, namely the correct and proper use of face
coverings, employing appropriate hand hygiene mea-
sures, and adopting appropriate social distancing
measures, such as concurrently recommended phys-
ical distancing in the UK at a minimum of 1 m+.
4. DISCUSSION
The HACCP framework allows for a rapid iden-
tification of the risks associated to a specific setting
and evolving disease outbreak, in this case SARS-
CoV-2 transmission to, from and between univer-
sity students. The COVID-19 pandemic has highly
disrupted education at all levels. It seems clear that
shutting educational facilities can reduce community
prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 but the harms long-term
closure would cause to individuals and wider soci-
ety are unacceptable. Therefore, strategies need to
be found that enable most education delivery to con-
tinue, including forms of training that require physi-
cal use of education facilities.
No degree of pandemic preparedness can ever
be fully comprehensive. This is because the nature of
microbial contagions is that they tend to have unique
features specific to the pathogenicity of the disease. A
unique feature of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is that
severe infection is uncommon within the key demo-
graphic groups of children and young people (Brook-
man et al., 2021). However, there are many aspects of
effective COVID-19 control that require tremendous
disruptions to the lives of young people. Our HACCP
assessment used a structured methodology to evalu-
ate opportunities for mitigating risks of SARS-CoV-
2 transmission associated with usual activities of uni-
versity students, in an effort to facilitate their contin-
ued and essential education and training.
It seems clear that a proportion of SARS-CoV-2
transmission is from infected persons who lack symp-
toms: either presymptomatic and probably com-
pletely asymptomatic infections (Gandhi, Yokoe, &
Havlir, 2020). The diversity of symptoms experi-
enced is also large: COVID-19 is not simply an
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influenza-like illness with fever and cough as diagnos-
tic symptoms (Sahoo, Jhunjhunwala, & Jolly, 2020).
This situation presents unique challenges in terms
of identifying cases and preventing them from pass-
ing the virus on. In peak prevalence periods, infec-
tion control relies on assuming that oneself and all
other persons are potentially infected and therefore
the only way to limit spread is through dramatically
decreased contact with all other persons—even those
with no contact or recent symptom history (Menon,
2020).
Our results feature recurring mitigation mea-
sures due to understanding of common disease trans-
mission pathways and dynamics. Physical distanc-
ing from others (at least 2 m ) is believed to be
especially effective because the predominant trans-
mission pathway is via saliva droplets and possibly
aerosols (WHO, 2020b). There is mixed quality evi-
dence about the utility of wearing masks or face cov-
erings to prevent COVID-19 in individuals. A recent
systematic review (Brainard, Jones, Lake, Hooper,
& Hunter, 2020) concluded that wearing masks had
some benefit for reducing transmission when either
or both infected and uninfected persons wore the
mask. However, we did not consider mask wearing
provided a guarantee of protection and was certainly
not a stand-alone alternative to other social distanc-
ing measures. The overall benefits of requiring pop-
ulations to wear face coverings on wider community
prevalence and subsequent mortality from COVID-
19 are thought to be definite but “limited” in impact
(Cowling & Leung 2020).
By focusing on high-risk contexts, we provide
recommendations that would have maximum effect
in keeping both the university and wider community
prevalence of the infections at relatively low and thus
manageable levels.
High ventilation rates and outdoor settings are
believed to be linked to lower risk of transmission
(Bhagat, Wykes, Dalziel, & Linden, 2020). Good
hand hygiene is basic infection control practice, as
are measures to reduce the chances of fomite trans-
mission (by sanitizing any potentially shared objects)
(Goldman, 2020; Mondelli, Colaneri, Seminari, Bal-
danti, & Bruno, 2020). How to follow these prin-
ciples in avoiding infection depends somewhat on
setting and activity, such as meetings, religious wor-
ship, returns from family visits, queuing, interactions
with household members, and so on. We acknowl-
edge in Supporting Information Table I that guidance
and understanding of best infection control practices
regarding COVID-19 are still emerging and recom-
mend that students consult local guidance as it is pub-
lished. Each transmission opportunity can be mini-
mized or even eliminated through careful implemen-
tation of the critical limits outlined in Supporting In-
formation Table I.
At our own university, the response to COVID-
19 has had three main components, covering com-
munications, social distancing, and testing and mon-
itoring. Regular communications were sent to all
students about COVID-19 safety measures and the
University’s expectations around responsible behav-
ior. These were reinforced by enhanced security and
monitoring of students on-campus, in accommoda-
tion and in other social settings, to discourage and
prevent social gatherings that span households. Hand
sanitizer and associated signage provided in teach-
ing rooms and at key points in communal areas
helped maintain a visible reminder of COVID-19
risk. To help ensure adequate distancing, one-way
systems for navigating corridors within buildings and
the narrower pathways outside on campus were in-
troduced. In addition, a precautionary approach to
2 m distancing in teaching rooms was pursued, based
on shoulder-to-shoulder measurement, and assuming
some potential movement of torsos while sitting at
desks (teaching room capacities were between 10 and
20% of normal).
At the start of autumn term, the University in-
troduced an asymptomatic testing scheme in part-
nership with the Earlham Institute, a genomics re-
search laboratory also located on the Norwich Re-
search Park (Gillam et al., 2020). The “Norwich Test-
ing Initiative” had capacity to analyze 500 PCR tests
per day. All members of the university community
(students and staff) who regularly visited campus
or lived there were encouraged to get tested. Pos-
itive case students and their households were iso-
lated for 10 days with nonsymptomatic, nonpositive
housemates isolating for 14 days, with regular welfare
support for those living off campus. There was daily
monitoring of case numbers and patterns by Univer-
sity Safety Services and members of the University’s
Executive Team, through a daily Major Operations
Group meeting, to review trends and patterns and
adjust the University’s response as necessary.
After students arrived back at UEA at the start
of autumn term, the number of actively positive stu-
dent cases being managed peaked at just 69 after 3
weeks, but fell to below 25 by week 6. There were
just two cases that tested positive in the previous 10
days, by December 9th. Of 360 cases in total detected
over the first 11-weeks of monitoring, just three were
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members of staff involved in teaching. This suggests
that the transmission reduction measures taken to
prevent spread in teaching spaces were successful.
This article presents a demonstration of how the
HACCP framework can be used as an infection mit-
igating tool to be used as part of the response to
an emerging infectious disease outbreak. Assessing
the success of the HACCP framework for this setting
at this time is a challenging task that would require
expanding its’ application across multiple university
settings, using different infection control strategies.
For such a complex, widespread and dynamic situa-
tion as presented by COVID-19, this would also re-
quire the development of novel, sophisticated, and
real-time costly monitoring tools, which would need
constant review and modification to have any chance
of being able to accurately evaluate such a rapidly
changing situation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The COVID pandemic has delivered many epi-
demiological lessons and revealed numerous short-
comings in both local and international responses
to emerging infectious diseases (EID). In the early
stages of responding to an EID outbreak, the use of a
response tool such as the HACCP framework allows
for the rapid identification of risks and hazardous be-
haviors. Better risk reduction strategies can be gen-
erated after implementation of in-depth epidemio-
logical studies, but such studies can take months or
years to complete and produce results and recom-
mendations. In contrast, the HACCP framework can
be implemented fairly quickly using diverse infor-
mants and stakeholders. The long-term consequences
of the emergence of COVID-19 are proving difficult
to predict, but we can still do much to limit pandemic
harms. There is considerable merit in rapid responses
methods to minimize harms linked to future disease
outbreaks.
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